看研报

CO-CHAIRMENSenator Angus King(I-Maine)Representative Mike Gallagher(R-Wisconsin)DECEMBER 2021COUNTERING DISINFORMATION IN THE UNITED STATESCSC White Paper#6Cyberspace Solarium Commission 1CONTENTSExecutive Summary 2Introduction Why Disinformation Is a Cyberspace Issue 4Section I:Te Commissions Strategic Approach and Recommendations as Tey Pertain to Disinformation 5Section II:Te United States Information Ecosystem 6Section III:Te Federal Governments Role 11Section IV:Current Federal Government Eforts 12Section V:Recommendations for Combating Disinformation 17Conclusion 28Abbreviations 29Endnotes 302 Cyberspace Solarium CommissionEXECUTIVE SUMMARYEXECUTIVE SUMMARYIn its March 2020 Final Report,the U.S.Cyberspace Solarium Commission called on the U.S.government to promote digital literacy,civic education,and public awareness in order to build societal resilience to foreign malign cyber-enabled information operations.As the scourge of disinformation swept across the globe and expanded its scope beyond elections,the Commission decided to conduct a deeper examination of cyber-enabled disinformation and propose steps that the United States could take to begin building greater resilience to disinformation,particularly from foreign actors.While many facets of the Commissions original strategy of“layered cyber deterrence”can be applied in the context of combating cyber-enabled disinformation,further action is needed from policymakers and lawmakers to enable the United States to better prevent,withstand,and respond to disinformation.In the context of disinformation,the United States faces stark foreign threats from nation-state adversaries,including most prominently China,Russia,and Iran.Tese governments leverage intelligence operators,foreign media outlets,businesses,and expatriates to spread disinformation in an efort to weaken confdence in key institutions,sow civil discord,and under-mine U.S.pillars and instruments of power.Tese malign foreign actors leverage traditional and social media to create and disseminate disinformation to pursue broader geopolitical goals,amplify acute crises,and exploit societal fssures.Yet even despite this clear and defned threat,the federal government must tread carefully when wading into the fraught world of disinformation.Its role must be defned narrowly and in a way that recognizes the inherent limitations on how a democratic government should infuence the information space,including but not limited to the guardrails enshrined in the First Amendment.Further complicating this role is the notion that educationcommonly ascribed a high level of impor-tance for building societal resilience to disinformationis a policy area largely within the purview of states and not the federal government.Still other areas,like the training of journalists,introduce concerns about the appearance of inappropri-ate government infuence and are better addressed by other stakeholders.Te federal government must therefore focus on building key partnerships with relevant stakeholders around the country and enabling these partners to do the right thing.Tis is not to imply that the federal government is not taking and cannot take important steps to counter disinformation.Indeed,elements of the State Department,the Federal Bureau of Investigation,the Department of Homeland Security,the Department of Justice,the Department of the Treasury,and the Ofce of the Director of National Intelligence currently engage in programming designed to protect the American people from the adverse efects of disinformation.Congress too has recognized the need for action,and members have introduced dozens of bills that seek to confront the challenge of disinformation.Te federal government,working with key partners,must chart a path forward that brings coherence to national eforts by prioritizing those threats that are most harmful and then taking steps to address them.Tis white paper sets out seven recommendations to both reduce the prevalence of disinformation in the information eco-system and build greater individual and societal resilience to disinformation and malign foreign infuence:Recommendation 1:Congress should establish a Civic Education Task Force,enable greater access to civic education resources,and raise public awareness about foreign disinformation.Recommendation 2:Congress should ensure material support to nongovernmental disinformation researchersCyberspace Solarium Commission 3EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Recommendation 3:Congress should fund the Department of Justice to provide grants to nonproft centers seeking to identify,expose,and explain malign foreign infuence campaigns to the American public Recommendation 4:Congress should create a capability within the Department of Homeland Security to actively monitor foreign disinformation Recommendation 5:Congress should create a grants program at the Department of Homeland Security designed to equip state and local governments with the personnel and resources necessary to identify foreign disinformation cam-paigns and incorporate countermeasures into public communications strategies Recommendation 6:Congress should reform the Foreign Agents Registration Act and direct the Federal Communications Commission to introduce new regulations in order to improve media ownership transparency in the United States Recommendation 7:Congress should grant a federal entity the authority to publish and enforce transparency guidelines for social media platformsTis white paper is the result of research and deliberation by Commission staf and commissioners.It seeks to explain how the Commissions original recommendations and strategy of layered cyber deterrence can be applied in the context of disinformation and contributes a set of comprehensive policy recommendations that lay a frm foundation upon which the United States,working with allies and partners,can build to combat disinformation and protect our most valuable demo-cratic institutions.4 Cyberspace Solarium CommissionINTRODUCTION WHY DISINFORMATION IS A CYBERSPACE ISSUEINTRODUCTION WHY DISINFORMATION IS A CYBERSPACE ISSUEThe United States Cyberspace Solarium Commission(CSC)was created by Congress in the National Defense Authorization Act(NDAA)for Fiscal Year 2019 to answer two fundamental questions:What strategic approach will defend the United States against cyberattacks of signifcant consequences?And what policies and legislation are required to implement that strategy?While disinformation is considered by some an issue largely separate from cybersecurity or network security,1 the Commission addressed disinformation in the very narrow context of elections in its fnal report in March 2020.As the COVID-19 pandemic swept across the globe,the Commission revisited the issue,this time in the context of disinformation about the pandemic itself,noting,“Our adversaries disinformation campaigns focused on the pandemic illustrate that disinformation activities can reach far beyond the political and electoral contexts with which Americans are best acquainted.”2Over the course of the intervening months,the Commission received demand signals from constituents within Congress and the executive branch to treat the topic of disinformation and potential policy recommendations more extensively.Te Commission has previously been reluctant to delve deeply into the topic of disinformation for two reasons.First,disinformation as a policy issue,unlike many aspects of cybersecurity policy,has been marked by a strong partisan divide.Researchers have identifed an association between strong partisanship and vulnerability to misinformation;3 more than two-thirds of U.S.citizens believe that Republicans and Democrats disagree about basic facts;4 and while U.S.citi-zens in both major parties agree that disinformation is a problem,they disagree about who is responsible for it and what ways to tackle the threat are appropriate.5 Although this partisan divide persists today,it is the sense of the members of the Commission that there is room to reach some agreement on core issues.Second,as noted above,disinformation is seen by many as an issue largely separate from cybersecurity and cyber policy in the United States.While the Commission understands this view,continuing to bifurcate these issues has become untenable.From a strategic perspective,the United States and its policymakers do themselves a disservice by continuing to diferentiate between the two when our adversaries do not.6 In order to craft a comprehensive strategy to defend the United States from cyberattacks of signifcant consequence,policy-makers must account for the entire arsenal employed by adversaries to cause harm in cyberspace,including information.It is also important to take a more operational or risk management perspective:disinformation campaigns waged against the United States by foreign actors are often carried out by many of the same threat actors as are active in cyberspace and are often the consequence of cyberattacks.For these reasons,members of the Commission believe that elements of the topic of disinformation are within our man-date.Tis white paper is the result of deep research,interviews with experts,and deliberations by the Commission.It seeks to explain how the Commissions proposed strategy of layered cyber deterrence applies to combating disinformation and contributes a set of policy recommendations to better position the United States to prevent,counter,and withstand the consequences of disinformation launched against it.Cyberspace Solarium Commission 5SECTION I:THE COMMISSIONS STRATEGIC APPROACH AND RECOMMENDATIONS AS THEY PERTAIN TO DISINFORMATIONSECTION I:THE COMMISSIONS STRATEGIC APPROACH AND RECOMMENDATIONS AS THEY PERTAIN TO DISINFORMATIONLayered cyber deterrence,the strategic approach proposed by the U.S.Cyberspace Solarium Commission in its March 2020 Final Report,combines a number of traditional deterrence mechanisms and extends them beyond the government to develop a whole-of-nation approach.By shaping behavior,denying benefts,and imposing costs on adversaries,the approach seeks to reduce the frequency and severity of cyberattacks of signifcant consequence.In combating disinforma-tion,the United States should adopt the same approach,and several CSC recommendations from the March 2020 Final Report pertain to disinformation.In the March Report,for example,the CSC made recommendations aimed at ensuring robust U.S.capability to respond to cyberattacks using cyber and non-cyber tools,including through defend forward operations and law enforcement action.Tese same recommendations can be applied in the disinformation context.Te executive branch should clarify the concept of“defend forward”and its applicability in preventing and responding to adversary disinformation campaigns,and Congress should strengthen non-military response tools.Further,the CSC recommended that“the U.S.government develop a multitiered signaling strategy aimed at altering adversaries decision calculus and addressing risks of escalation.”7 In addition to signaling about cyber,such a strategy should seek to communicate capability and resolve,delineate thresholds of behavior that will trigger a response,and convey intent behind U.S.actions in the information space.Te report also emphasized the importance of resilience in managing cyber risks.Such management includes strengthening public resilience against the pernicious messaging promoted by disinformation.Te complete elimination of disinformation,like the elimination of all traditional cyber threats,is not a realistic outcome.Understanding the malicious actors or nations strategic objectives and fnding ways to deny those objectives,regardless of the means being used,provides a sustainable and agile approach that can mitigate harm even as the adversary changes tactics.Tis was the thinking behind the CSC recom-mendation on teaching digital literacy and reinvigorating civic education to counter the erosion of trust in democracy and democratic institutions that is so often the goal of disinformation.Still other recommendations from the CSCs subsequent white papers may also apply to combating disinformation in the United States.For example,in its May 2020“Cybersecurity Lessons from the Pandemic”white paper,the CSC recom-mended that the Ofce of the Director of National Intelligence create the Social Media Data and Treat Analysis Center(DTAC)to act as a convening and sponsoring authority for social media companies and other third parties that will coop-erate in collating social media data to facilitate analysis of foreign threat networks,analysis of foreign infuence operations,and information sharing.8 While policymakers are still debating the institutional home of the DTAC,this center should be created and stafed to carry out its mandate.Further,in the same white paper,the CSC advocated for improving the capac-ity of nongovernmental organizations(NGOs)to identify and counter foreign disinformation and infuence campaigns.Tis recommendation remains as compelling as before.To date,however,the CSC has neither fully treated nor proposed a suite of complementary recommendations aimed directly at the challenge of combating disinformation.Before doing so,it is critical to grasp the intricacies of the United States information environment,including the threats and soft targets,and to understand existing government eforts aimed at addressing disinformation in the U.S.information ecosystem.6 Cyberspace Solarium CommissionSECTION II:THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION ECOSYSTEMSECTION II:THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION ECOSYSTEMThe question of how best to describe harms in the information environment has been the subject of scholarly disagree-ment,9 and terms like“disinformation,”“misinformation,”“malinformation,”“information operations,”“infuence operations,”“information warfare,”and“malign infuence,”to name just a few,are all used in various contexts by experts.It is important not to use them interchangeably,because they describe specifc phenomena,each of which requires a diferent policy solution.Te CSC focuses on the problems of disinformation,or“false information that is deliberately created or disseminated with the express purpose to cause harm,”and misinformation,or“information that is false,but not intended to cause harm.”10 Both disinformation and misinformation are tools used in the broader context of“infuence operations,”which the RAND Corporation defnes as“the collection of tactical information about an adversary as well as the dissemina-tion of propaganda in pursuit of a competitive advantage over an opponent.”11 In many cases,the information activities of adversaries involve explicitly false information;in others,such activities rely on misleading information,taken out of context or presented in an infammatory manner,and employ a kernel of truth to conceal the otherwise malign actions.Te CSC concentrates on disinformation and misinformation as elements of broader infuence operations because this focus creates a more narrow and appropriate scope for federal action.Adversaries of the United States,operating out of both foreign and domestic locations,conduct operations to spread both disinformation and misinformation in the United States in an efort to undermine public confdence in core democratic institutions,sow discord and polarize the population,and place the health and safety of Americans at risk.While the elections of the past decade have newly drawn attention to the issue of disinformation in the United States,the malady is not confned to the context of elections.Adversaries of the United States have taken advantage of dis-and misinformation campaigns to weaken public trust in all our institutions,undermine public health(both during and before the COVID-19 pandemic),and create friction or confusion during U.S.military and diplomatic engagements abroad.A.THREATSAdversaries of the United States leverage infuence operations and disinformation campaigns in an efort to degrade con-fdence in key institutions,sow civil discord,and undermine U.S.pillars and instruments of power.Although most states and,increasingly,many non-state actors deploy information as a means of infuence over other states,foreign adversaries using disinformation campaigns to undermine U.S.national security interests include Russia,China,and Iran.In taking such actions,each of these countries seeks not only to undermine U.S.objectives but also to pursue their own diplomatic,military,and economic objectives.In addition,within our own borders,domestic political actors wittingly and unwittingly wield or amplify disinformation in furtherance of political goals.1.RussiaRussia employs a mix of methods to muddy the information environment in pursuit both of long-term objectives,includ-ing undermining the instruments of U.S.power and trust in democratic institutions,and of short-term objectives,such as cultivating civil tension over specifc issues like race relations or infuencing elections.12 In the United States,Russia draws on print,online,television,radio,and social media to construct divisive narratives and spread mistruths.Te three primary Cyberspace Solarium Commission 7SECTION II:THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION ECOSYSTEMRussian intelligence agenciesthe Federal Security Service(FSB),the Foreign Intelligence Service(SVR),and the Main Directorate of the General Staf of the Armed Forces(GRU)each conduct information operations that impact the U.S.information environment.13 In addition,the Russian government distributes propaganda and disinformation through ofcial channels,like those issuing ofcial government statements;through state-funded entities,including foreign-facing media like Russia Today;and through proxy sources,including Russia-aligned outlets with global reach and English-language out-lets such as the Strategic Culture Foundation,Global Research,New Eastern Outlook,and Geopolitica.ru.14 Many of these proxy outlets obfuscate their Russian state connections by employing American or other Western authors and academics.Peace Data,for example,was a Russian site that paid real journalists to produce content in order to lend it legitimacy even as it was producing false and misleading content.15 In furtherance of their information objectives,Russian infuence operators have become adept at leveraging social media networks and fringe websites to infltrate communities of interest in the United States using false personas,to stand up campaigns to undermine institutions,and to amplify protests or broader civil discord.16 Russia also routinely conducts cyber operations in order to steal sensitive private information and leak it to the press.17 While such information is not necessarily false,it does saturate the media ecosystem and distract public attention from other issues,thereby shaping public opinion.All in all,Russias disinformation eforts have focused on volume,leading RAND Corporation analysts to coin the expres-sion“frehose of falsehoods”to describe how Russian disinformation is inundating the media environment.18 2.ChinaChina,like Russia,is involved in a long-term strategic infuence operation aimed at shifting values around the world and positioning itself as a new ideologue.19 During the COVID-19 pandemic,China began operating an increasingly com-prehensive international infuence apparatus,using both overt and subtle tactics in an attempt to erode U.S.and partner countries infuence.Tese eforts have included propaganda related to the coronavirus and to the United States handling of the outbreak.20 In some of the most egregious cases,they have also involved attempts to stop European government sources from reporting on its COVID-19 misinformation eforts.21 However,its disinformation campaigns are not confned to the issue of COVID-19;they have extended to areas such as the states treatment of Uighurs in Xinjiang,technology compe-tition,the U.S.-China relationship,and pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong.22 Tese campaigns have been fueled by the aggressive use of social media(the same social media to which China denies its citizens access)as Chinese government ofcials promote narratives favorable to the Chinese Communist Party(CCP).23 Overtly,a new class of vocal and vitriolic diplomats,colloquially referred to as“Wolf Warriors,”often take the lead in propagating conspiracy theories via ofcial Twitter accounts,interviews,and press releases.24 In addition to the push by individual high-level diplomats,a dedicated community of state-paid internet users,often called the“50 cent party,”echoes these talking points amid praise of the CCP across the internet.25 At a more subtle and subversive level,Chinas COVID-era escalation of its disinformation campaign against the United States continued during the 2020 presidential election with the use of fake Twitter accounts to push out misleading videos,which were then echoed by Chinese bots.Most notably,Chinese-linked accounts published footage purporting to show a man burning ballots marked for Donald Trump,which then received upward of 1.2 million views.26 Such tactics are similar to those pioneered and deployed by Russia in the 2016 election campaign and point toward the CCPs increasingly active and hostile disinformation posture.8 Cyberspace Solarium CommissionSECTION II:THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION ECOSYSTEMChinas Propaganda Eforts in XinjiangIn 2017,growing attention began to focus on Chinas repression and forced detention of Uighurs,members of an ethnically Muslim minority who live primarily in Chinas western Xinjian province,under the guise of antiterrorism efforts.27 Since then,journalists have obtained piles of evidence documenting the mass detentions.28 Estimates in 2019 were that more than 1 million Uighurs were being held in internment camps;29 and even as leaders claimed that the program was“winding down,”the construction of new camps has continued.30As international criticism has mounted,31 China has engaged in a global propaganda campaign to deflect attention from its practices by criticizing the human rights practices of other countries,32 co-opting ordinary citizens into its efforts to reshape the narrative,33 and amplifying social media content in favor of its version of events.34In one notable action detailed by the New York Times,Chinese authorities have facilitated the production of hundreds of videos from supposedly ordinary citizens extolling the freedom they enjoy in Xinjiang.35 These videos are uploaded to Chinese platforms like Pomegranate Cloud or Douyin and then recirculated on YouTube and Twitter in an apparently coordinated campaign.Some of the Twitter accounts pushing these videos have been suspended for violating the sites policies regarding spam and platform manipulation.3.IranIran is a smaller but still powerful player focused on gaining regional infuence,controlling its citizens access to informa-tion,and preserving its national image.36 Researchers who have studied and tracked Irans eforts have focused on the use of sockpuppets(false online identities)to launder information and push distorted narratives,especially with respect to Israel and Saudi Arabia.37 Irans propaganda and disinformation eforts heavily feature a sense of exaggerated moral authority.For example,following the U.S.governments killing of Qassem Soleimani in early 2020,Iran mounted a propaganda campaign that promised vengeance or retaliation.38 Pervasive Iranian disinformation eforts continue to address the Israeli-Palestinian confict and the possibility that the United States might reenter the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action(JCPOA).39 A recently declassifed report by the Director of National Intelligence evaluated with high confdence that Iran launched a multipronged disinformation campaign connected to the 2020 elections that was aimed at denigrating then-President Trump and sowing discord domestically.40 In one of its more brazen eforts,Iranian actors sent threatening emails to voters in Florida in an attempt to make them change their votes.While Irans eforts became more frequent,its tactics remained technically unsophisticated.Te report concludes that in their eforts,Iranian actors relied mainly on low-cost cyber tools supplemented with information operations(including spearfshing campaigns).Further analysis indicated that multiple actors within the Iranian government took part in the disinformation campaign,suggesting that Ayatollah Khomeini prior-itized a“whole-of-government”approach.41 Much like both Russia and China,Iran is seeking in these campaigns to subvert trust in democratic institutions and sow discord between political parties around the world.B.VECTORSIn the context of disinformation,vectors represent the ways in which information spreads.In the United States,any discus-sion of disinformation necessarily involves social media platforms.42 Tis attention is largely merited as,according to Pew Research Center,53 percent of American adults read the news on social media.43 In Q2 of 2020,Facebook alone removed more than 7 million posts that contained fake news and labeled 98 million posts with“warning notices about coronavirus misinformation.”44 in the following quarter,sites producing provably false content generated 1.8 billion interactions on Cyberspace Solarium Commission 9SECTION II:THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION ECOSYSTEMFacebook.45 However,while social media plays an important role in amplifying disinformation and is a primary vector through which disinformation spreads,disinformation existed long before the advent of social media.Online sourcesincluding websites(like the Russian proxy websites)with links to or run by foreign intelligence agenciesprint media,television,radio,and in-person networks all contribute heavily to the creation and dissemination of disinformation in the U.S.media ecosystem.How Disinformation Spreads across PlatformsWhile researchers have called for greater access to social media data so that they may fully understand the spread of disinformation across platforms including Facebook,Twitter,and YouTube,46 some studies and anecdotal evidence have already demonstrated how disinformation appears on fringe platforms,migrates to more mainstream social media platforms,and finally is picked up by traditional media sources in newspapers and television.47For example,fringe platforms,social media,and mainstream media have all been involved in the spread of conspir-acy theories about COVID-19 and the safety of COVID-19 vaccines.48 Fringe platforms like 4chan and 8kun showed a spike in conversations about the Pfizer COVID-19 vaccine in November 2019,following the companys announcement of positive results from its Phase III clinical trials.Many of these conversations relied on links to known conspiracy sites and affiliate sites,which are used to launder information,49 as well as to Russian state media and sites known to push pro-Kremlin narratives.These links then spread to Facebook and Twitter,in some cases generating thousands of interactions.The proliferation of misinformation about COVID-19 vaccines has generated sustained media attention,as main-stream news outlets attempt to assure Americans of the vaccines safety and efficacy.50 Even though much of this coverage focuses on debunking conspiracy theories and misinformation,experts describe it as a win for the perpetra-tors,whose main goal is amplification.51 C.DISINFORMATION AS A TOOL TO AMPLIFY ACUTE CRISES AND EXPLOIT SOCIETAL FISSURESDisinformation threatens to broadly undermine public confdence in the United States governments ability to govern efectively.Diferent threat actors leverage diferent topics to sow discord,create confusion,and damage trust in the U.S.government,society,and economy.While adversaries often fnd and focus on targets of opportunity,many campaigns share the goal of weakening faith in democracy and seek to exploit public anxiety regarding race relations,economic inequal-ity,and public health.No system of government is perfect,and adversaries exploit citizens frustration with democratic outcomes and the sometimes slow and messy process by which democracies fashion their policies.By contrast,autocratic adversaries like Russia and Chinaunimpeded by basic protections for citizens rights or by processes that involve hashing out disagreements among competing interestsare able to place stricter controls on information,silence opposition,and,if need be,respond with great fexibility to populist impulses swayed by disinformation.Tese advantages do not make autocracy preferable to democracy:the features that make democracies uniquely vulnerable to disinformation perpetrated by adversary nations are precisely the features worth protecting.But the need to operate within the constraints of democracy does introduce unique challenges for countries seeking to compete with comparatively untrammeled adversaries.Disinformation can represent a sharp tool with which key adversaries can create or exacerbate acute crises related to health,safety,and security.China,for example,has relied heavily on disinformation to push narratives throughout the COVID-19 10 Cyberspace Solarium CommissionSECTION II:THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION ECOSYSTEMpandemic,focusing eforts on undermining democratic responses to the pandemic,disputing the origins of the virus,and causing widespread panic by amplifying false messages.52 However,the targeting of public health issues in the United States is not limited to the context of COVID-19.For the better part of two decades,the Russian state has sought to undermine the American publics confdence in vaccinations.Tis efort has involved using Russian content polluters to sow discord about vaccines,which researchers suggest may damage public health because“normalizing these debates may lead the public to question long-standing scientifc consensus regarding vaccine efcacy.”53 Some have therefore concluded that the Russian government believes in“the anti-vaxxer/pro-vaccination debate as one of the fssures within American society that it can exploit.”54 Te intent of this misinformation is to undermine the American publics faith in U.S.institutions,a decline that would in turn weaken the United States and our ability to counter the Kremlin.In addition,other wedge issues,such as race relations,have provided fertile ground for disinformation campaigns to take root.As Americans took to the streets in June 2020 to protest police brutality and racism in the United States,foreign media outlets in Russia and China“piggybacked onto hashtags linked to George Floyd.to push divisive messages and criticize Washingtons handling of the unfolding crisis.”55 Tis tactic prompted the Department of Homeland Security to issue an intelligence bulletin to law enforcement agencies containing the assessment that foreign adversaries had sought to capitalize domestic political tensions for geopolitical goals.56 Perpetrators of disinformation sought to impersonate black Americans by using fake social media profles and to leverage content focused on Black Lives Matter protests to express support and crit-icism of both presidential candidates,Biden and Trump.57 Tough foreign actors latched on to the recent protests to push disinformation,these tactics were not new:according to a Senate report after Russias interference in the 2016 presidential election,black Americans were the largest target of Russian social media disinformation.58 Domestic racial tensions are just one arena in which foreign adversaries have used existing divisions or ongoing events to sow chaos.Further,Russia is among the adversaries that have actively manufactured and spread disinformation to reduce the infuence of the United States and its allies in the international arena.59 Over the past decade in particular,Russia has used disin-formation to undermine various arms control norms and institutions.An ongoing disinformation campaign orchestrated by the Kremlin seeks to conceal the illegal use of chemical weapons by itself and its allies.In 2018,Russia violated the Chemical Weapons Convention by using a nerve agent in an attempt to assassinate Sergei Skripal,a former Russian spy,in the United Kingdom.60 Subsequently,the Russian state is alleged to have employed its disinformation machine to defect its responsibility for the attempted murder of the Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny via a Novichok-class nerve agent.61 After German doctors confrmed that a nerve agent was responsible for Navalnys illness,Russia immediately denounced the accusations,calling the announcement a“smear campaign”against Russian authorities.62Finally,military service members and veterans are especially ripe targets for disinformation,and adversaries like Russia have focused their eforts on these individuals.A 2019 report by Vietnam Veterans of America“documented persistent,pervasive,and coordinated online targeting of American servicemembers,veterans,and their families by foreign entities who seek to disrupt American democracy.”63 An earlier report from 2017 detailed Russian attempts to hack,spearphish,and target service members and veterans with disinformation,relying on tactics such as“posing as attractive young women to gather intelligence”and distributing propaganda on social media after friending service members on Facebook.64 Te same report suggests that Russia uses platforms targeted at veterans in order to push pro-Russia propaganda and partner with other Russian front organizations.65 In addition to targeting service members and veterans,adversaries have made the U.S.military the object of disinformation campaigns and conspiracy theories:during the pandemic,Russian and Chinese news sources sought to stoke fear regarding martial law and the National Guards role in response to the pandemic.66 Other disinforma-tion episodes,seeking to undermine NATO exercises in Europe,have spread allegations that members of the U.S.Army killed a Lithuanian boy.67 Some of this targeting may be enabled by online platforms like Facebook that continue to allow Cyberspace Solarium Commission 11SECTION III:THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS ROLEadvertisements to target military personnel.68 In 2019,at a hearing held by the House Veterans Afairs Committee on online disinformation targeting veterans,one disinformation expert testifed that veterans are targeted because they“are highly respected members of society who positively infuence their country and their community.”69 Te goal of these particular foreign disinformation campaigns is the same as that of others:“to further amplify and exploit the existing frustrations in the veteran community”and,in so doing,“to wear away veterans faith in the U.S.system.”70 SECTION III:THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENTS ROLESubsequent sections of this white paper discuss current federal eforts under way to deal with the problem of disinfor-mation and propose specifc recommendations for the federal government,but it is important to note at the outset the limitations and unique circumstances of the U.S.federal government as it seeks to address disinformation.Protected by the First Amendment,freedom from government interference in speech and access information is a fundamental American value.In addition,the United States is home to many of the worlds leading media and social media companies,which own and operate much of the information environment not only domestically but also internationally.Tese realities pose unique challenges and opportunities for the United States,including the need to determine the appropriate scope of the role of the federal government and to manage collaboration between the federal government and the private owners and operators of the information space.A.RECOGNIZE FEDERAL LIMITATIONSWhile the federal government has a diverse set of tools that can be applied to the challenge,not all of these tools are appro-priate and should be applied.For example,with few exceptions,in developing policy that involves the content of speech the federal government is constrained by the First Amendment.71 Te protections that amendment afords are the lifeblood of democracy,and censorship is inimical to the values that underpin a healthy,functioning information environment.Furthermore,censorship erodes U.S.strength abroad by undermining American support not just for freedom of speech and the press internationally but for an open information environment more broadly.Platforms themselves can moderate the content that appears online,but the federal government can intervene only in extremely limited circumstances,subject to strict legal scrutiny.72 Another constraint arises from the Tenth Amendment,which reserves to states the right to make policy in areas not dele-gated to the federal government by the Constitution.As a result,state and local governments have had primacy over areas like education,providing greater local control over what is taught in schools.Te federal government can and does exercise infuence over education policy through instruments like funding.73 However,it should not dictate the content of the school curricula.74In other areas,federal action must avoid the appearance of inappropriate government infuence over parts of society that are better served by other stakeholders.Te sphere of journalism,for example,was investigated by the CSC in the course of researching and writing this white paper.Te CSC considered recommendations that might bolster the ability of rigorous independent journalism to counter disinformation.Not only can journalists play an important role in providing credible,authoritative information to the American public,75 but they are also themselves targets of disinformation.76 However,the 12 Cyberspace Solarium CommissionSECTION IV:CURRENT FEDERAL GOVERNMENT EFFORTSCSC abandoned the idea,in part because of concerns that the government might appear to be supporting certain media outlets or propagandizing.Moreover,the media plays a crucial role in holding the government accountable(as at least two-thirds of both Republicans and Democrats agree),77 and any government support that compromises the ability or perceived ability of independent journalists to provide neutral and unbiased reporting on its activities does more harm than good.When it comes to countering disinformation by bolstering journalism,other stakeholders from civil society or private industry might be better positioned than the federal government to take the lead.B.BUILD PARTNERSHIPSIn keeping with the importance of establishing an appropriate scope for the federal governments role,partners will be essen-tial to any national disinformation strategy.Private industry;state and local governments;and civil society are all crucial partners for several reasons.Private industry,such as social media companies and traditional media companies,own and operate the core infrastructure through which disinformation fows.States and localities are critical not only because they are perceived as more trustworthy or reliable sources of information than is the federal government,78 but also because they have jurisdiction over infrastructure or policiesincluding education policy and elections administrationthat are central to the disinformation challenge.Civil society organizations can provide credible research on the disinformation campaigns spread-ing across platforms and can work to hold accountable both the private sector and government through rigorous journalism and fact-checking.79 Each of these actors brings resources and expertise to bear on the problem,and they expand the set of tools available for countering disinformation.Tese partners can also help expand access to authoritative information and counter false or misleading narratives with greater credibility than the federal government.A Pew Research Center survey from the fall of 2020 reported that the proportion of Americans who trust the federal government,which has not passed 30 percent since 2007,has fallen to just 20 percent.80 And while the percentage of Americans who trust their state governments has also declined since the early 2000s,it has consistently remained above its lowest point(51 percent,in 2010).81 In 2018,fully 63 percent of Americans expressed trust in state government and 72 percent expressed trust in local government.82 Tese statistics show that state and local agencies can better serve as trusted sources for information than their federal counterparts and are,therefore,essential partners in the efort to provide authoritative information regarding topics such as election integrity or COVID-19.SECTION IV:CURRENT FEDERAL GOVERNMENT EFFORTSOver the past several years,the federal government has made strides in addressing the problem of online disinformation,but important structural barriers to efective progress in this area remain.Eforts sufer from a lack of strategy,coor-dination,and prioritization.Leadership on the issue is lacking,in part because there is no clearly designated department,agency,or ofce around which all eforts should coalesce.Much as in the case of cybersecurity,multiple departments and agencies have resources and expertise that come to bear on the problem of disinformation.And much as in the case of cyber-security before the creation of the Ofce of the National Cyber Director,no single federal entity has the oversight,authority,or resources to assume ownership for countering disinformation;nor is it clear that a single federal entity should assume Cyberspace Solarium Commission 13SECTION IV:CURRENT FEDERAL GOVERNMENT EFFORTSsuch ownership.As a result,federal executive agencies including the Ofce of the Director of National Intelligence(ODNI),the Federal Bureau of Investigation(FBI),and the Department of Homeland Security(DHS)have created a number of centers,task forces,and initiatives meant to deal with the problem of foreign infuence and disinformation.Still,there is cause for optimism regarding the federal appetite to address cyber-enabled disinformation,particularly when it emanates from foreign entities.Every National Defense Authorization Act since 2017 has made reference to the subject and authorized federal action.83 Both the executive branch and Congress have demonstrated a willingness to respond to foreign interference campaigns,particularly those afecting elections.Te Department of Justice has indicted operatives tied to disinformation campaignsnotably,those associated with the Russian Internet Research Agency.84 Te Department of the Treasury has also sanctioned Russian and Iranian entities and individuals engaged in election interference,85 using the powers granted by Executive Orders 13757 and 13848.86A.FEDERAL AGENCY INITIATIVESOn the heels of the news that Russia had attempted to interfere in the 2016 presidential election,the Trump administra-tions 2017 National Security Strategy included a section on“information statecraft”under the heading“Preserve Peace Trough Strength.”87 Naming Russia and China among the adversaries seeking to“weaponize information”for strategic gain and control the information available to their own publics,the document recognized that“U.S.eforts to counter the exploitation of information by rivals have been tepid and fragmented.U.S.eforts have lacked a sustained focus and have been hampered by the lack of properly trained professionals.”88 Similarly,although the Biden administration has not yet released its National Security Strategy,the interim guidance published in March 2021 identifed mis-and disinformation as among the tools used by adversary nations to“exploit perceived weaknesses and sow division within and among free nations,erode existing international rules,and promote alternative models of authoritarian governance.”89 Refecting the emphasis of current and former administrations on countering the threat of cyber-enabled disinformation,federal initiatives have sought to increase information-sharing among federal agencies and between the government and the general public on ongoing disinformation campaigns.Tey have also focused on public diplomacy and providing technical assistance to foreign publics that may be afected by disinformation campaigns.Te following list is not exhaustive but rather provides an overview of some of the most notable ongoing eforts by federal departments and agencies.1.Rumor ControlIn the run-up to the 2020 election,the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency(CISA)launched rumorcontrol.gov to prebunkthat is,to preemptively warn of and expose90disinformation related to the integrity of the election by providing authoritative information on election protection eforts.91 Some federal messaging campaigns have focused on reaching specifc audiencesCISA partnered with the Vietnam Veterans of America on the#Protect2020 campaign,similarly designed to combat disinformation regarding the integrity of the election.92 In an attempt to replicate the success of CISAs website,other federal departments and agencies have created similar sites to address coronavirus-related disinfor-mation.Te Federal Emergency Management Agency and Department of Defense,for example,both have“rumor control”sites to help“distinguish between rumors and facts regarding the response to the Coronavirus(COVID-19)pandemic,”and both aggregate links to the pages of other federal departments and agencies involved in coronavirus response.93 Te Department of Justices website also provides information on how to spot coronavirus-related scams,as does the Federal Trade Commissions.94 States,too,have followed this model.Maryland,for example,established its own rumor control sites 14 Cyberspace Solarium CommissionSECTION IV:CURRENT FEDERAL GOVERNMENT EFFORTSaddressing the election and the coronavirus,as did Colorado.95 And in April 2021,a bipartisan group of 11 secretaries of state asked the Department of Homeland Security to expand its eforts to push back against foreign disinformation cam-paigns and thanked the department for its eforts during the 2020 election.962.Mis-,Dis-,and Malinformation TeamTe Countering Foreign Infuence Task Force,established in 2018 within CISAs predecessor agency,became in 2021 the Mis-,Dis-,and Malinformation(MDM)team,which“works in close coordination with interagency and private sector partners,social media companies,academia,and international partners on a variety of projects to build resilience against malicious information activities.”97 In its approach to public awareness,the MDM team focuses on three stakeholder groups:(1)subject-matter experts who enhance understanding of the threat,(2)“trusted voices”that can help amplify messaging,and(3)the general public for which the teams informational materials are designed.Te team also seeks to“route dis-information concerns to appropriate social media platforms and law enforcement.”Tese public awareness eforts have included two graphic novels focused on identifying disinformation.983.Foreign Influence Task ForceIn the fall of 2017 the FBI established its own task force,focused on the threat of foreign infuence,which is intended to coordinate the Counterintelligence,Cyber,Criminal,and Counterterrorism Divisions.99 Its work deals largely with investi-gations,information-sharing,and private-sector partnerships.4.Protected Voices InitiativeTe FBI,DHS,and ODNI work together to run the Protected Voices Initiative and provide resources to political campaigns desiring to protect themselves from cyberattacks and foreign infuence campaigns.100 Teir videos and materials have covered topics such as business email compromise,cloud-based services,ransomware,multi-factor authentication,and social media literacy.Tey provide tips and best practices for“protecting your digital devices,social media accounts,and private infor-mation from cyberattacks.”1015.Global Engagement Center(GEC)Te Global Engagement Center(GEC)was established in 2016 by Executive Order 13721 for the purpose of coordinating governmentwide communications to foreign publics on terrorist narratives.102 Section 1287 of the FY17 NDAA amended the GECs mandate,so that it now leads federal eforts“to recognize,understand,expose,and counter foreign state and non-state propaganda and disinformation eforts aimed at undermining United States national security interests.”103 GECs functions include“identifying current and emerging trends in foreign propaganda and disinformation in order to coor-dinate and shape the development of tactics,techniques,and procedures to expose and refute foreign misinformation and disinformation and proactively promote fact-based narratives and policies to audiences outside the United States.”104 So far,the GEC has released a report on Russias propaganda and disinformation eforts;105 its Technology Engagement Team“leads U.S.Government innovation eforts by convening technology experts and programmatic authorities from the public and private sectors,”and“has developed a dedicated efort for the U.S.Government to identify,assess,test and implement technologies against the problems of foreign propaganda and disinformation.”106Cyberspace Solarium Commission 15SECTION IV:CURRENT FEDERAL GOVERNMENT EFFORTS6.Office of the Director of National IntelligenceIn April 2021,ODNI announced the creation of the Foreign Malign Infuence Center to focus on“coordinating and integrating intelligence pertaining to malign infuence,drawing together relevant and diverse expertise to better under-stand and monitor the challenge.”107 Te center builds on existing eforts run through ODNI,including a series of Intelligence Community Assessments on disinformation,mainly focused on elections.108 In addition,the 2021 Intelligence Authorization Act required the creation of the Social Media Data and Treat Analysis Center to facilitate public-private cooperation on countering disinformation.109 Te intelligence community plays an important role in bringing the broader strategic context to conversations about foreign disinformation,highlighting the ways in which our adversaries leverage disinformation in pursuit of their larger diplomatic,national security,and economic objectives.B.CONGRESSIONAL PROPOSALSIn the 117th Congress alone,legislators in both chambers have introduced more than 40 bills that contain the word“misinformation”or“disinformation.”Dozens of other bills address similar topics of relevance to this white paper,including foreign infuence,civic education,media and advertising,and social media regulation,though without specifc reference to the problem of disinformation.Te breadth of the proposed legislation demonstrates that there is congressional appetite to make progress on this issue.Like the recommendations contained in this report,these proposals attempt to address the problem of disinformation and foreign infuence over the American public using a variety of diferent tools.However,partisanship is rampant:as shown below,nearly two-thirds of the disinformation-relevant bills introduced so far during the 117th Congress lack bipartisan co-sponsorship.Congressional interest in addressing disinformation has risen since 2016,when Russian eforts to undermine the integrity of the presidential election generated public anxiety about its role.During the 113th Congress(201314),just two bills were introduced that contained the term“misinformation,”and none contained the word“disinformation.”Interest in the topic rose steadily,however,and during the 116th Congress(201921),nearly 100 bills were introduced that referred to“misinformation”or“disinformation.”Tat session also marked an important shift:for the frst time,less than half the bills pertaining to the topic had bipartisan support.Currently,just over a quarter of the way through the 117th Congress,legislators are on pace to introduce a record number of bills related to disinformation and misinformation.16 Cyberspace Solarium CommissionSECTION IV:CURRENT FEDERAL GOVERNMENT EFFORTSBills Introduced that Mention“Disinformation”or“Misinformation”C.SANCTIONS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIONFederal responses to ongoing disinformation campaigns have largely focused on law enforcement action and sanctions against actors attempting to interfere in the media environment in the context of elections.Te primary targets have been Russian actors,though recently the Department of Justice charged an American citizen with election interference.110 In the most notable case,a grand jury indicted 13 individuals and three companies associated with the Internet Research Agencya Russian operation that attempted to interfere in the 2016 presidential electionfor criminal conspiracy to defraud the United States,conspiracy to commit wire fraud and bank fraud,and aggravated identity theft.111 In a more recent action,the Department of Justice charged a Florida resident with interfering in the 2020 presidential election by using social media to knowingly disseminate false information about voting.112Te Department of the Treasury has also levied sanctions against actors using cyber-enabled means to interfere in elec-tions,relying on two executive orders(EOs)and one piece of legislation.In 2016,President Obama signed EO 13757,an amendment to an earlier EO on cyberattacks,113 to authorize the imposition of sanctions against those“tampering with,altering,or causing a misappropriation of information with the purpose or efect of interfering with or undermining election processes or institutions.”114 In 2018,President Trump signed EO 13848 to authorize sanctions against those determined to have“directly or indirectly engaged in,sponsored,concealed,or otherwise been complicit in foreign interference in a United States election.”115 Both of these EOs enable the Department of the Treasury to freeze the assets and block the transactions of individuals who have been added to the Ofce of Foreign Assets Controls Specifcally Designated Nationals list because they have behaved in the ways specifed above.Both EOs also enable Treasury to sanction those who“materially,fnancially,or technologically assist”others who engage in such behavior.To date,Treasury has taken action pursuant to these EOs against more than 100 individuals for election-related interfer-ence and cyber-enabled disinformation.Some of these actions have built on the above-mentioned indictments of Russian individuals involved in eforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election or have targeted Russian nationals and compa-nies involved in interference in the 2018 midterm elections.116 Others have involved Iranian actors and entities,including a number of Iranian government organizations,because of their interference in the 2020 presidential election.117 Te Department of Justice has also used its authorities pursuant to the Foreign Agent Registration Act and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to seize domains used by Iran to target Americans and infuence public opinion.118 Bills with sponsors from a single partyBipartisan bills0102030405060113th Congress114th Congress115th Congress116th Congress117th CongressCyberspace Solarium Commission 17SECTION V:RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COMBATING DISINFORMATIONSECTION V:RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COMBATING DISINFORMATIONThrough intelligence and information-sharing programs,public diplomacy eforts,and a variety of cost imposition measures,federal eforts have sought to shape the behavior of actors attempting to spread disinformation,and Congress has responded to disinformation with a variety of approaches.What these federal eforts lack,however,is an underlying strategy to combat disinformation and a clear articulation of roles and responsibilities for addressing diferent aspects of the problem.As the federal government attempts to take on disinformation,it must pay attention to the interplay between digital and analog systems.Disinformation is neither new nor unique to the online environment:it predates the Internet,119 and it spreads across radio,television,and print sources.120 Moreover,U.S.citizens consume news from a range of outlets.While social media is an increasingly popular source of information,with slightly more than half of Americans reporting they get news“sometimes”or“often”from digital platforms,121 more than 40 percent of Americans still prefer to get their news instead from television,radio,and print sources and regard news on social media with skepticism.122 Tese statistics vary across age groups,as more than half of adults age 50 and older say they“often”receive their news from television.123 Not all threats in the information environment are equally harmful.Nor does the federal government have the resources to treat all threats as equally harmful.An efective approach to disinformation must enable the federal government to identify and prioritize those threats that are most dangerous,while ignoring those that are not likely to have a signifcant impact.Te strategy and recommendations outlined in this white paper prioritize those threats that are most likely to do signifcant harm either to democratic institutions or to health and human safety.In the past year alone,the American public has been faced with disinformation campaigns that threaten both of these targets,demonstrating that dangerous threats are real and pervasive.In addition to identifying and prioritizing the threats that are most harmful,the federal government must develop a com-prehensive strategy to deal with those threats.To date,the federal government has not crafted a coherent strategy for the information environment,one that recognizes the unique vulnerabilities of democratic societies to disinformation and their unique strengths in responding to it.Nor has the government developed a strategy that contends with the difculty of reconciling the United States respect for and promotion of free speech and access to information(including from abroad)with the need to protect the American people from disinformation threats that undermine national security.Recommendation 1:Congress should establish a Civic Education Task Force,enable greater access to civic education resources,and raise public awareness about foreign disinformationDisinformation robs democracies of the informed and engaged citizenry necessary for a government of,by,and for the people.Along with providing recommendations to counter other kinds of malicious cyber activity,the Commission recog-nizes that the most sustainable way to mitigate the impact of disinformation is to build public resilience against the perni-cious messages that are being promoted.Our adversaries,often amplifying and amplifed by domestic voices,hope to so thoroughly muddle the truth that Americans give up trying to distinguish lies;to portray democracy and its institutions as so broken that Americans give up on the prospect for change and reform;to so severely exacerbate divisions that Americans lose sight of our fundamental shared values and sense of civic identity and civic responsibility.To counter these eforts,the United States needs to reinvigorate civic education,thereby restoring a sense of shared values and empowering citizens to be 18 Cyberspace Solarium CommissionSECTION V:RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COMBATING DISINFORMATIONmore efective agents of change through constitutional means.A renewed emphasis on civic education should also include media and digital literacy initiatives to help people become more discerning consumers of information and develop the skills needed to understand the concept of civic responsibility in the digital age.It is a national security imperative for the U.S.government to“promote and reinvigorate American understanding of the importance of democracy and our democratic institutions,as a bulwark against foreign eforts to exploit divisions and complacency.”124Civic education is also essential for developing the sense of civic responsibility necessary to meet national security challenges.People who understand the Constitution and founding documents of the United States and feel a sense of responsibility to their community and nation are more likely to make an efort to avoid sharing disinformation.Traditional cybersecurity,too,is a shared responsibility between government,business,and individuals.However,if Americans do not have instilled in them a sense of civic responsibility,they are far less likely to appreciate their role,at work and at home,in protecting the cyber ecosystem.Similar concerns arise in the context of COVID-19 and other public health issues.In support of the need to promote citizens engagement,Congress is considering bipartisan,bicameral legislation to reinvig-orate civic education.125 Congress should move forward,with the urgency dictated by the national security imperative,to put in place resources and programs that provide appropriate federal support for civic education at all ages.An assessment by the Campaign for the Civic Mission of Schools revealed that the federal government annually spends roughly$54 per student on STEM education(science,technology,engineering,and math)and only 5 cents per student on civics;126 as a result,according to the last National Assessment,only 25 percent of eighth graders test as“profcient”in civics.127Without overriding the principle that curricular content should be determined at the state and local levels,there is much that the federal government can and should do to help remedy the shocking decline in civic education and meet our national security needs.Tese actions include funding for state and local educational entities,grant programs,challenge programs,and resource development,as well as other steps to enable greater access to civic education resources for students and adults,to train teachers,to encourage excellence in civic education,and to raise public awareness about the threat of disinformation.In all these eforts,Congress should prioritize and support programs and projects that build an understand-ing of,and appreciation for,our Constitution and founding documents.Civic Education Task ForceCongress should establish a bipartisan Civic Education Task Force at the Department of Education to design and make publicly available civic education and digital and media literacy courses for the military,civil servants,and the broader adult population.Courses should focus on the importance of our Constitution,founding documents,and the federal govern-ments structure;on how the federal government interacts with all stakeholders,including state and local governments;and on digital literacy and media literacy.Te task force should include representatives from state and local governments and government organizations,subject matter experts,and representatives from expert organizations,including,but not limited to,academic organizations,nonprofts,and private-sector organizations.To drive the widespread adoption of courses designed by the task force,the Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice should implement mandatory completion of civic education and digital literacy courses for employees of state and local entities that receive federal funding,including state and local law enforcement.Te Ofce of Management and Budget should implement mandatory completion of similar civic education and digital literacy courses for federal government employees.Te Department of Defense should implement mandatory completion of civics and digital literacy Cyberspace Solarium Commission 19SECTION V:RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COMBATING DISINFORMATIONtraining for members of the military regarding the role,structure,and organization of the military and the federal govern-ment as an element of initial session training and as part of the Transition Assistance Program.Civic Education ClearinghouseCongress should authorize and appropriate funds for the Department of Education to create a clearinghouse of resources for voluntary use by K-12 educators teaching civic education,applied civics,and service learning.In developing the clear-inghouse,the Department of Education should be empowered to consult with state and local governments and govern-ment organizations,subject matter experts,and nonproft organizations,and it should place a particular emphasis on our Constitution and founding documents,as well as on media and digital literacy.Te Department of Education should also produce a strategy for working with external partners to distribute the resources made available through the clearinghouse.Te clearinghouse should highlight the recipients of the award and recognition program and include information about the Civic Education Fund,described below.Student and Teacher Awards ProgramCongress should authorize and appropriate funds for the Secretary of Education to create an award and recognition program to highlight both excellence by students and excellence by teachers in delivering and teaching civic education,applied civics,and service learning.Civic Education FundCongress should create a Civic Education Fund and provide an initial investment of$500 million and commit$200 million each year to state educational agencies(SEAs),local educational agencies(LEAs),institutions of higher education(IHEs),and nonproft organizations to enable grantees to develop and implement best practice curricula that incorporate civic edu-cation,applied civics,and service learning across K-12 education and to provide teacher development opportunities in civic education,applied civics,and service learning,with a particular emphasis on our Constitution and founding documents.Congress should create an Ofce of Civic Education responsible for overseeing and administering the Civic Education Fund and coordinating other civic education and service-learning initiatives of the federal government.Te director of the ofce should be confrmed by the Senate.National Disinformation Awareness Outreach ProgramCongress should direct the Department of Homeland Security to create the National Disinformation Awareness Outreach Program to promote broader public awareness about disinformation through government-sponsored public service announcement(PSA)campaigns run by nongovernmental organizations.Te program should not develop the PSA mate-rial itself,but instead administer a fund to which nonproft organizations producing PSAs may apply.Te sponsored PSAs should focus on building awareness about how disinformation spreads and how it afects the general public,not the specifcs of recent disinformation campaigns.20 Cyberspace Solarium CommissionSECTION V:RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COMBATING DISINFORMATIONPartner Approaches:Media Literacy in FinlandFinland has invested heavily in media literacy programs that ultimately aim to counter disinformation and build societal resilience.As of 2021,Finland continues to lead the European media literacy index rankings,128 which measure a countrys resistance to disinformation.Because of collaboration across different sectors,Finnish schools have been able to actualize a comprehensive media literacy education program.129 In order to develop specialized curricula focused on media literacy and civics and implement Finnish national media education policy,media education professionals work with the National Audio-visual Institute and the Ministry of Education and Culture.130 The Department for Media Education and Audiovisual Media(MEKU)is legally tasked with promoting media education,improving youth media skills,and fostering a safe media environ-ment for children;131 moreover,MEKU serves as the primary coordinator for media education at the national level.132 Finnish civil society is also involved in creating curricula to bolster the media literacy of Finnish students.An NGO-run fact-checking service called Faktabaari adapts professional fact-checking methods for use in schools,and provides digital literacy“toolkits”that emphasize research and critical thinking skills.133 The government works closely with the media,business,and higher education sectors in both formulating and implementing these programs.Finlands media literacy curriculum is integrated into a variety of subjects,helping students to better understand how the con-cept applies to all types of engagement with information.For example,in a math lesson,“pupils learn how easy it is to lie with statistics”and are brought to understand the importance of producing and analyzing data with integrity and nuance.In an art class,students see how an images meaning can be manipulated or changed with photo-editing software.134 In history lessons,students“analyze notable propaganda campaigns”and their consequences,while in language courses,“teachers work with them on the many ways in which words can be used to confuse,mislead,and deceive.”135 Students are taught fact-checking skills and reliable-source selection practicesnot only while writing term papers but also in lessons that specifically address social media and news.Ultimately,these more specific skills translate to improvements in students critical thinking and ultimately to greater voter literacy:rather than focusing on debunking false claims or specific disinformation narratives,media literacy workshops emphasize the development of both a strong national narrative and a well-informed,critical student within that national narrative.Recommendation 2:Congress should provide funding for nongovernmental disinformation researchersTe federal government alone cannot address the complex set of questions regarding the nature and impact of foreign disin-formation campaigns afecting the United States.Academic institutions,think tanks,nonprofts,and corporate entities have all played important roles in the efort to identify and expose online disinformation campaigns,and the federal government can support the work of these organizations by providing funding and research opportunities in conjunction with the Social Media Data and Treat Analysis Center.136 Te research task is multifold,and nongovernmental organizations can help create richer understandings of disinformation campaigns,analyze medium-and long-term trends in the content and struc-ture of disinformation campaigns,develop taxonomies and common defnitions to enable further research,and study the efectiveness of countermeasures aimed at diminishing the impacts of disinformation.Tis type of research is central both to creating a more informed,resilient public by raising awareness of potential and ongoing threats and to building the evidence base upon which future policy solutions to the disinformation challenge can be developed.Congress should provide funding for disinformation researchers through grants programs and legislation that ensures non-governmental researchers access to data on disinformation.Cyberspace Solarium Commission 21SECTION V:RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COMBATING DISINFORMATIONDisinformation Research GrantsCongress should enhance funding to the National Science Foundation(NSF)to provide grants for rigorous research on foreign disinformation.Congress should boost funding to the Divisions of Behavioral and Cognitive Sciences,Social and Economic Sciences,Computer and Network Systems,and Information and Intelligent Systems in support of further research on:Te actions of adversary nations in the information environment and their efect on the perceptions of U.S.citizens and attitudes toward democracy;Te economics of disinformation and how federal action can reduce incentives for the creation and propagation of disinformation;Te impact of manipulated media(also known as“deepfakes”)on the perceptions,attitudes,and behaviors of online users;and Technical solutions for verifying the provenance of images,audio,and text in order to help identify,label,and contextu-alize manipulated media that appears online.137In addition,Congress should fund DHS,in consultation with ODNI,to provide grants for priority areas established annually,and eligible grant applicants should be encouraged to work with the DTAC.Initial priorities should be building baseline understandings of the threat landscape in the information environment and of the impact of information threats on democratic publicsresearchers should develop taxonomies of threat,identify metrics for evaluating the impact of disinfor-mation campaigns,and identify metrics for evaluating the impact of countermeasures.Congressional Research Service StudyCongress should task the Congressional Research Service with producing a study on federal laws that govern the sharing of social media data,both analyzing how existing legislation constrains the ability of social media companies to lawfully share those data in support of rigorous scientifc research on disinformation and identifying potential solutions(either through amendments to existing legislation or the drafting of new legislation)so that independent research on disinformation,its spread across social media platforms,its impact on behaviors and attitudes of the American public,and the efectiveness of countermeasures against disinformation can be carried out.Ensuring Data AvailabilityCongress should task the National Institute of Standards and Technology(NIST)with working with social media compa-nies and researchers to develop a voluntary standardized data transfer format for social media data,thereby enabling both data portability for social media users and research on disinformation that crosses multiple social media platforms.“Data portability”means the ability to take data from specifc services and take it elsewhere.138 Although several major social media companies have launched a Data Transfer Project to make it easier for users to move their data across platforms,privacy con-cerns have hindered robust data portability eforts.139 Standardized data transfer formats and data portability could beneft both consumers seeking to take their data elsewhere and,by making it easier to compare data across platforms,researchers studying disinformation.140 22 Cyberspace Solarium CommissionSECTION V:RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COMBATING DISINFORMATIONRecommendation 3:Congress should fund the Department of Justice to provide grants to nonprofit centers seeking to identify,expose,and explain malign foreign influence campaigns to the American publicAs the damage caused by COVID-19-related disinformation makes clear,in addition to undertaking long-term public education initiatives,it is imperative that the United States possess the capacity in real time to identify highly dangerous disinformation activities and make them known both to the platforms that enable the activities and to the general public.Civil society must also maintain a robust nongovernmental capability to identify these disinformation activities and their malign infrastructure.It is critical that the U.S.government help ensure that social media companies,other media outlets,and stakeholders in the private sector and civil society continue building the expertise and credibility necessary to sound the alarm when disinformation campaigns pose an urgent threat to the American public.To help bolster the nongovernmental capability to recognize and publicize such operations,Congress should fund the Department of Justice to provide grants through the Ofce of Justice Programs(which may be administered through a com-ponent of that ofce),in consultation with the Department of Homeland Security and the National Science Foundation,to nonproft centers seeking to identify,expose,and explain malign foreign infuence campaigns to the American public while putting those campaigns in context to avoid amplifying them.Te CSC included this recommendation in the May 2020 white paper,“Cybersecurity Lessons from the Pandemic,”141 and the continued spread of disinformation related to the pandemic and the safety of vaccines reafrms its importance.Recommendation 4:Congress should create a capability within the Department of Homeland Security to actively monitor foreign disinformationTe U.S.government should help identify,highlight,and shine light on foreign propaganda eforts and disinformation in the U.S.media environment and present the American public with factual information.However,as researchers at the Center for Strategic and International Studies note,“the intelligence community is limited in what it can do inside the United States,particularly regarding infuence operations.Te FBI is focused on the counterintelligence aspects but not leading a proactive public campaign,nor would we expect it to.Te Department of Homeland Security(DHS)may be a logical choice but has not been given the mission.”142 To efectively shine light on and communicate about these operations,attribution is helpful,in the same way that some responses to cyber campaigns require the federal government to identify the perpetrators.Te publics resilience against disinformation may be heightened if the disinformation is credibly linked to a specifc malicious actor.Te federal government should ensure that it has the capabilities and resources necessary to appropriately and reliably attribute disinformation campaigns in order to increase the efectiveness of policy responses and enhance public resilience.Congress should task the Secretary of Homeland Security,in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the Director of the FBI,with creating a capability within DHS to actively monitor foreign propaganda narratives,terrorist pro-paganda narratives,and violent extremist narratives in the U.S.media and social media environment;to inform the public of their contents;and to present factual information on topics treated in such propaganda.Cyberspace Solarium Commission 23SECTION V:RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COMBATING DISINFORMATIONCreation of CapabilityCongress should task the Secretary of Homeland Security,in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence,with creating a capability within DHS to identify foreign state-sponsored propaganda narratives and violent extremist narratives that afect the American public and with developing a Rapid Alert System to inform the public of the contents of such narratives and present scientifc,statistical,and empirical information on relevant topics.143 Te capability should sit within DHS but consist of personnel from DHS,ODNI,the FBI,and the Department of State,and it should be empowered to collaborate across the federal government,as necessary.Te capability should serve as a clearinghouse for information sharing and joint eforts across the federal government in combating foreign propaganda,terrorist propaganda,and violent extremist narratives.Te capability should be authorized to enter agreements with social media platforms to share informa-tion in both directions on foreign propaganda,terrorist propaganda,and violent extremist propaganda narratives and eforts.Relationship with the Global Engagement CenterTe capability should also be empowered to share information with and receive information from the State Departments Global Engagement Center,which focuses on identifying,analyzing,and countering foreign propaganda afecting U.S.foreign policy interests as well as the interests of partner and allied nations.Congress should amend the FY17 NDAA to clarify the GECs role and relationship to a DHS-housed capability for monitoring and countering domestic disinformation.Te GEC should focus its eforts on identifying and countering disinformation likely to afect foreign perceptions of U.S.foreign policy or the health of foreign media environments,providing targeted fnancial support and training to foreign media outlets and organizations aimed at identifying and exposing propaganda put forward by adversarial nations such as Russia,China,and Iran.DHS should have primary responsibility communicating to policymakers and the public about for-eign-backed disinformation designed to afect U.S.domestic policy or the social and political stability of the United States.Data Sharing with Private StakeholdersCongress should direct DHS,in consultation with ODNI and the FBI,to develop a plan for using data from such sources as major social media platforms,open-source intelligence companies,and other private investigative bodies to inform and increase public confdence in government-provided attribution.In producing the plan,DHS should develop and coordinate a public-private process to facilitate the voluntary sharing of information with the federal government for the purpose of attributing foreign and extremist disinformation campaigns and should develop options to swiftly impose consequences.In addition,the plan should provide a blueprint for coordinating with partners and allies to promote multidirectional infor-mation sharing between partner governments,the U.S.government,state and local governments,academia,and the private sector.24 Cyberspace Solarium CommissionSECTION V:RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COMBATING DISINFORMATIONPartner Approaches:Te United Kingdoms RESIST Disinformation ToolkitThe United Kingdom has recognized disinformation as a national security threat since at least 2019.144 In response to the threat,the government has pursued several different mechanisms,including the development and publication of a RESIST Disinformation toolkit.145 The toolkit is intended for government professionals,policy officers,special advisors,and other public-sector communications professionals,regardless of agency,role,or issue.RESIST offers a step-by-step guide to aid organizations and individuals in developing a response when disinformation affects the organization or individual directly.In doing so,the toolkit is intended to(1)build resilience to disinformation and(2)prevent the spread of disinformation by equipping government communicators with the skills and information necessary both to anticipate the impact of disinfor-mation on their work and to reorient messaging strategies in response to ongoing disinformation campaigns.Broadly speaking,the RESIST toolkit aims to provide a systemic and efficient approach to countering disinformation that harms U.K.society and its national interests by helping civil servants“Recognise disinformation”by highlighting objec-tives and principles of disinformation,and then providing“Early warning”through media monitoring and analytical tools,“Situational insight”to make early warning more actionable,and“Impact analysis”to assess the likely goals,impacts,and reach of disinformation.The toolkit finally offers“Strategic communication”guidance and helps policymakers“Track outcomes.”The RESIST toolkit supports the“dissemination of reliable,truthful information that underpins.democracy,”while ensuring that core democratic principles such as freedom of speech are protected.Notably,the toolkit emphasizes that organizations must continue to deliver effective positive communications to the public on important issues,regardless of a current disinformation presence,and offers methods for doing so.Recommendation 5:Congress should create a grants program at the Department of Homeland Security designed to equip state and local governments with the personnel and resources necessary to identify foreign disinformation campaigns and incorporate countermeasures into public communications strategies Given the relatively high levels of trust in state and local governments as compared to the federal government,one of the most efective ways in which the federal government can counter disinformation is to enable state and local governments to take the lead in some public communications.But like their counterparts in federal departments and agencies,the public afairs teams in state and local government agencies are often underfunded and lack the capability to educate the public about disinformation afecting state and local policy issues.Te federal government should also ensure that state and local governments,including state and local election ofcials and courts,can apply for funding to equip their communications teams with additional personnel and the tools to identify and counter disinformation in areas likely to afect health and human safety or the integrity of democratic institutions.Congress should authorize the creation of a grant program administered by the Department of Homeland Security and should appropriate sufcient funding for the program to equip state and local governments with the personnel and resources necessary to identify disinformation campaigns and incorporate countermeasures into public communications strategies as government plans or policies afecting health and human safety or the integrity of democratic institutions are rolled out.Cyberspace Solarium Commission 25SECTION V:RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COMBATING DISINFORMATIONAllocation and PurposeGrants should be allocated to those state government entities primarily responsible for plans and policies that afect health and human safety or democratic processes and institutions,including,but not limited to,health departments and organi-zations administering elections or state and local courts.Grants should be used to hire or train personnel or to acquire the tools necessary to identify disinformation campaigns and incorporate counter-messaging strategies into communications plans.Use of GrantsOrganizations applying for grants should submit detailed plans for the use of funds administered through the grant pro-gram,and after receiving a grant they should report on the actual use of funds and associated outcomes.Such plans should incorporate strategies for identifying and countering not only digital foreign disinformation but also foreign disinformation circulating in broadcast or print media.Communications plans developed through the grant program should focus,to the extent practicable,on evidence-based strategies for countering disinformation and on disseminating authoritative scientifc or statistical information in support of government plans and policies.Grant recipients should be empowered to consult with local intermediary organizations,with the goal of identifying trusted community members with which they can partner and gain help in reaching the populations most vulnerable to disinformation.Duration and EvaluationCongress should appropriate funds for the grant program to be distributed over two years,with grants awarded on a quar-terly basis for a period lasting no longer than one year.Te Secretary of Homeland Security should submit to Congress an annual report on the funds administered through the grant program and,to the extent possible,provide metrics for evaluat-ing the programs outcomes.Te second of these annual reports submitted to Congress,after the grant program concludes,should make recommendations regarding whether the grant program should be continued and what modifcations to the program,if any,would enable it to better accomplish its purpose of equipping state and local government communicators with the resources necessary to anticipate and counter disinformation afecting health and human safety or the integrity of democratic institutions.Recommendation 6:Congress should reform the Foreign Agents Registration Act and direct the Federal Communications Commission to introduce new regulations in order to improve media ownership transparency in the United StatesTe level of trust in the ability of mass media to report the news“fully,accurately,and fairly”is falling.In 2000,12 percent of the adult population in the United States rated their trust level in mass media as“not at all”;by contrast,51 percent had either a great deal of trust or a fair amount of trust.In 2020,33 percent of American adults had no trust in mass media,while only 40 percent had a great deal or fair amount of trust.146 Many factors afect overall levels of trust in the media,but American news consumers should be empowered to understand the sources of information in their news environment.When media outlets are foreign-owned and operated,transparency regulations are crucial to ensuring that American news consumers are aware of the foreign actors attempting to infuence public opinion.When media outlets are domestic,transparency rules are still crucial,for they help American news consumers contextualize the information they receive.26 Cyberspace Solarium CommissionSECTION V:RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COMBATING DISINFORMATIONCompetition in media markets is important for more than purely economic reasonsit is also central to ensuring that a diverse array of voices and perspectives can be heard and that local news markets are responsive to local concerns.Congress should strengthen the Department of Justices ability to investigate potential violations of the Foreign Agents Registration Act(FARA)by foreign media companies,remove exemptions for foreign media companies registered under the Lobbying Disclosure Act(LDA),and clarify how FARAs requirements to fle“informational materials”every six months relate to social media and email content.Congress should also direct the Federal Communications Commission(FCC)to promulgate new regulations on media ownership transparency for all media companies operating within the United States.Foreign Agents Registration Act ReformCongress passed the Foreign Agents Registration Act in 1938 in response to Nazi propaganda,147 with the intent not to censor foreign propaganda but to promote transparency regarding the sources of information being disseminated to the American public.148 Under the law,foreign agents are required to register with the DOJ and regularly fle information regarding their activities in the United States,including copies of“informational materials”disseminated in the course of such activities.Te law gives the DOJ the authority to investigate potential FARA violations,and to date,the DOJ has taken action under FARA against certain foreign-owned media,including the Russian-owned RT media outlet.149 However,current law stipulates that an individual or entity registered under the Lobbying Disclosure Act need not register under FARA,unless the individual or entity is acting on behalf of a foreign government or foreign political party.150 Because of this exemption,the records collected under FARA contain an incomplete picture of individuals operating as foreign agents within the United States.Congress should therefore amend FARA to remove from the LDA exemption those foreign organizations that produce media content for consumption by the public,including political advertisements,and ensure that fling requirements for FARA registrants are sufciently robust for the digital age.Tis narrowing of the exemption should be designed in such a way that it does not require all foreign-owned private companies to register as foreign agents under FARAexemptions should continue to apply to foreign car manufacturers,for example,that register under the LDA.Furthermore,the amend-ment should stipulate a process whereby media organizations from allied countries may apply for a license allowing them to maintain the exemption.Congress should also update FARA reporting requirements by amending the defnition of“informational materials”to make clear that social media and email communications are covered,specifying which types need to be included in FARA flings.Several proposals to amend the law in this manner have been put forward by members of Congress,but none has yet been adopted.151 In amending the defnition,Congress should ensure that the DOJ adopts a records system that allows the social media posts that are fled to be maintained in a dynamic form,along with comments,while preserving appropriate privacy protections.152 Finally,Congress should grant the DOJ greater authority to investigate FARA violations,improve FARA compliance,and enforce FARA disclosure requirements.A bill introduced in 2017,titled the Disclosing Foreign Infuence Act,153 could serve as a template for these reforms.Te bill would grant the DOJ civil subpoena authority to investigate possible FARA viola-tions,would remove FARA exemptions for those that register under the LDA,would require the development of a FARA enforcement strategy,and would require reports from the DOJ Inspector General and the Government Accountability Ofce(GAO)on the enforcement strategy and efectiveness of the new law.154 A similar bill introduced in 2021,the Chinese Communist Party Infuence Transparency Act,would remove LDA exemptions for all Chinese corporations.155Cyberspace Solarium Commission 27SECTION V:RECOMMENDATIONS FOR COMBATING DISINFORMATIONMandate Media Ownership TransparencyCongress should amend the Telecommunications Act of 1996156 to task the FCC with developing new regulations on media ownership transparency.Te FCC currently regulates foreign ownership of broadcast media;157 moreover,it requires foreign media outlets to submit reports on their activities.158 Te FCC also has numerous rules in place regarding media ownership to ensure competition within American media markets,and by law,the FCC must review these rules every four years to determine whether they are still necessary.159 But no regulation currently requires domestic media companies to disclose their ownership,and as a result American news consumers often lack reliable information about the corporate entities that own and operate local,regional,or national news outlets.Congress should task the FCC with developing new rules regard-ing ownership transparency for all media outlets in order to empower Americans in evaluating the sources of their news.Recommendation 7:Congress should grant a federal entity the authority to publish and enforce transparency guidelines for social media platformsSocial media platforms have changed how people consume information.While not the sole purveyors of information,platforms are leveraged by peddlers of mis-and disinformation to“provoke and amplify political and social discord in the United States.”160 Because of their unique position in the information ecosystems,platforms can exert positive infuence over the media and information environment.Policymakers and lawmakers should resist the impulse to regulate content outside of what is already exempted from First Amendment protections.161Congress should direct the Biden administration to report back within 90 days with a plan to task an entity with establish-ing clear transparency guidelines for social media companies.Tis entity should not moderate content but should be tasked with developing rules pertaining to requirements for:Transparency reporting regarding content moderation policies and takedowns;Transparency and labeling of advertisements on platforms;Transparency requirements for information-sorting algorithms on platforms;Labeling of content created by FARA-registered agents;Labeling of bot accounts and content spread by bots;and Policies and processes to be developed by social media companies to disclose the use of bots and other such tools.28 Cyberspace Solarium CommissionCONCLUSIONCONCLUSIONDisinformation is a challenging policy issue.It touches on individual freedom and liberty.It involves foreign inter-vention in our democracy while afecting national security and the foundations of U.S.democracy.It is inherently political in that it sways hearts and minds.It weaves deftly through modern society and networksvisible only sometimes but always threatening.Te recommendations contained in this white paper are equally challenging,and policymakers will fnd it more difcult to implement somelike regulation of social media companiesthan others.While the recommenda-tions are to an extent interconnected,they can be implemented individuallyand each would represent progress in the fght to combat disinformation.Cyberspace Solarium Commission 29ABBREVIATIONSABBREVIATIONSCCP Chinese Communist PartyCISA Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency COVID coronavirus disease CSC Cyberspace Solarium Commission DHS Department of Homeland SecurityDOJ Department of JusticeDTAC Social Media Data and Treat Analysis Center EO executive order FARA Foreign Agents Registration Act FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation FCC Federal Communications CommissionGEC Global Engagement Center IHE institution of higher education LDA Lobbying Disclosure Act LEA local educational agency MDM team Mis-,Dis-,and Malinformation teamMEKU Finnish Department for Media Education and Audiovisual Media NATO North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNDAA National Defense Authorization Act NIST National Institute of Standards and TechnologyNGO nongovernmental organizationODNI Ofce of the Director of National Intelligence PSA public service announcement SEA state educational agency 30 Cyberspace Solarium CommissionENDNOTESENDNOTES1 Laura Rosenberger and Lindsay Gorman,“How Democracies Can Win the Information Contest,”Washington Quarterly 76,no.2(2020):7596;Ashish Jaiman,“Disinformation Is a Cybersecurity Treat,”Medium,January 30,2021,https:/ Morgan and Renee DiResta,“Information Operations Are a Cybersecurity Problem:Toward a New Strategic Paradigm to Combat Disinformation,”Just Security,July 10,2018,https:/www.justsecurity.org/59152/information-operations-cybersecurity-problem-strategic-paradigm-combat-disinformation/;Laura Fichtner,“What Kind of Cyber Security?Teorising Cyber Security and Mapping Approaches,”Internet Policy Review 7,no.2(May 15,2018),https:/policyreview.info/articles/analysis/what-kind-cyber-security-theorising-cyber-security-and-mapping-approaches.2 U.S.Cyberspace Solarium Commission,“Cybersecurity Lessons from the Pandemic,”CSC White Paper#1(May 2020),11,available at https:/www.solarium.gov/public-communications/pandemic-white-paper.3 Dimitar Nikolov,Alessandro Flammini,and Filippo Menczer,“Right and Left,Partisanship Predicts(Asymmetric)Vulnerability to Misinformation,”Harvard Kennedy School Misinformation Review,February 15,2021,https:/misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/right-and-left-partisanship-predicts-asymmetric-vulnerability-to-misinformation/.4 Aaron Smith,“How Americans View Tech Companies,”Pew Research Center,June 28,2018,https:/www.pewresearch.org/internet/2018/06/28/public-attitudes-toward-technology-companies/.5 Amy Mitchell et al.,“Many Americans Say Made-Up News Is a Critical Problem Tat Needs to Be Fixed,”Pew Research Center,June 5,2019,https:/www.pewresearch.org/journalism/2019/06/05/many-americans-say-made-up-news-is-a-critical-problem-that-needs-to-be-fxed/.6 Laura Rosenberger and Lindsay Gorman,“How Democracies Can Win the Information Contest,”Washington Quarterly 43,no.2(2020):7596.7 U.S.Cyberspace Solarium Commission,Report of the United States of America Cyberspace Solarium Commission(March 2020),34,available at https:/www.solarium.gov/report.8 CSC,“Cybersecurity Lessons from the Pandemic,”1213.9 A Wanless and J Pamment,“How Do You Defne a Problem Like Infuence?,”Journal of Information Warfare 18,no.3(2019):114.10 Claire Wardle,“Information Disorder,Part 1:Te Essential Glossary,”First Draft Footnotes(blog),July 9,2018,https:/ Operations,”RAND,2021,https:/www.rand.org/topics/information-operations.html.12 Renee DiResta and Shelby Grossman,“Potemkin Pages&Personas:Assessing GRU Online Operations,20142019,”November 12,2019,available at https:/cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/publication/potemkin-think-tanks.13 Conor Cunningham,“A Russian Federation Information Warfare Primer,”Henry M.Jackson School of International Studies,November 12,2020,https:/jsis.washington.edu/news/a-russian-federation-information-warfare-primer/.14 U.S.Department of State,GEC Special Report:Russias Pillars of Disinformation and Propaganda(August 2020),United https:/www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Pillars-of-Russias-Disinformation-and-Propaganda-Ecosystem_08-04-20.pdf.15 Alicia Wanless and Laura Walters,“How Journalists Become an Unwitting Cog in the Infuence Machine,”Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,October 13,2020,https:/carnegieendowment.org/2020/10/13/how-journalists-become-unwitting-cog-in-infuence-machine-pub-82923.16 U.S.Department of State,GEC Special Report:Russias Pillars of Disinformation and Propaganda.17 James Shires,“Hack-and-Leak Operations and U.S.Cyber Policy,”War on the Rocks,August 14,2020,https:/ Solarium Commission 31ENDNOTES18 Christop